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Abstract 
 This paper investigates the impact of communication cost on the FDI activities of 
multinational corporations (MNCs). First, we provide a theoretical foundation for a 
gravity-type FDI model, which shows that physical distance and communication 
technology are important determinants of FDI activities. Second, we apply the IT-
augmented gravity model to bilateral FDI data for a total of 47 OECD and non-OECD 
countries from 1980 to 1997 and find that distance is negatively related to inward FDI 
stocks while the growth of IT, measured by teledensity and celldensity, has encouraged 
FDI significantly. The impact is found to be more prominent on FDI from G7 countries to 
OECD countriesthan to non-OECD countries, and more prominent in the 1990s than in 
the 1980s. Moreover, IT plays a more effective role by reducing communication cost 
when distance is beyond a threshold range.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The existing literature on multinational corporations (MNCs) has long recognized 
the importance of headquarter services, which provide knowledge-based and knowledge-
generating activities (Markusen, 1984 and 1995, Markusen and Venebles 1998). 
Examples of headquarter services include R&D, financial management, technology 
know-how, marketing skills, and so on. It is assumed that these intangible assets can be 
transferred and shared by multiple production facilities with little cost.  In other words, 
the existing theory suggests distance does not matter for the emergence of MNCs, 
especially for horizontal MNCs when there is no trading of goods. However, empirical 
evidence almost always revealed that physical distance is negatively and significantly 
related to multinational activities even after controlling for trade and investment costs 
(Carr et. al. 2001).  
The purpose of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the negative role of 
distance in  the FDI activities by MNCs. Unlike the traditional view, we consider distance 
to represent the communication cost of moving information and knowledge rather than 
the cost of moving goods for MNCs. As we observe in practice, the transfer of 
headquarter services through the travel of key personnel or post mail can be costly. The 
development of modern information technology (IT) provides a more efficient way for 
sharing information and knowledge within MNCs.  
Following the communication cost and international trade model proposed by 
Harris (1995) and then further developed by Kikuchi and Ichikawa (2002) and Kikuchi 
(2003), we consider the communication cost for FDI to have two components. First, it is 
proportional to the distance between the home and host countries with the coefficient 
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determined by the state of IT in both countries. The second part of the communication 
cost includes the investment of building a communication network. Our model provides a 
theoretical justification for using a gravity equation for FDI. That is, multinational 
activities decrease with distance while increasing with the development of IT and the 
economic sizes of the home and host countries.  
The empirical section of this paper utilizes the recently available bilateral FDI 
stock data for 27 OECD and 20 non-OECD countries between 1980 and 1997. Applying 
an IT-augmented gravity model, we find that the relationship between distance and 
inward FDI stocks is always negative, which is similar to international trade. Most 
importantly, we find that the increasing density of telephone lines and wireless phones 
encourage bilateral FDI for all pairs of countries. The impact of IT is found to be greater 
for FDI from G7 to OECD countries than that to non-OECD countries.  Meanwhile,  the 
impact of IT on FDI is more prominent during the 1990s than the 1980s. In addition, IT 
performs a more important role in reducing the perceived distance when the distance 
between two countries is greater than a threshold range.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of 
FDI with communication cost. The empirical test and findings are reported in Section 3. 
Section 4 provides the conclusions.  
 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
This section develops a MNC model with communication costs in the spirit of the 
multinational theory developed by Helpman and Krugman (1980), Markusen and 
Venables (1998), and Ethier (1986). For simplicity, we assume there is only one factor 
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for production: labor. All costs are measured in terms of labor units hereafter. To 
emphasize the importance of the knowledge-capital model, multinational firms in country 
i (=1,2) have to decide the level of investment in headquarter services, represented by hi, 
in the first stage. Firms will choose output for production in the second stage. 
The central assumption of our model is that the transfer of headquarter services to 
different locations requires communication cost, CCi. The communication cost has two 
parts. The first part of CCi represents the time and expenses needed for exchanging 
information through the traveling of key multinational personnel and other  possible 
channels. In other words, it is proportional to the distance between the two countries (D) 
with coefficient ci(Ti,Tj), where Ti and Tj (i≠j=1,2) represent the state of information 
technology in country i and country j, respectively, and ii Tc ∂∂ / , 0/ <∂∂ ji Tc . The 
reason that the technology parameter not only depends on the home country’s technology 
but also the foreign country’s technology is due to the joint provision of service 
requirement for mail and telecommunication services.1
The second part of the communication cost is what firms have to pay to be 
connected to the global network. To accommodate the incoming and outgoing telephone 
traffic and the level of headquarter services, we assume that the cost to build a 
communication network infrastructure for country i is proportional to the product of 
population in  country  i and country j, Li*Lj, and the headquarter services hi. Similar to 
Harris (1995), it is assumed that parent firms share the home country’s infrastructure cost 
equally. If the number of multinational firms headquartered in country i is mi, we have 
the total communication cost for a multinational firm in country i as follows. 
  
                                                 
1 See Tang (2003) for a discussion of the institutional arrangement for international communications. 
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According to equation (1), CCi is an endogenous variable: it is not only determined 
by headquarter services hi, another endogenous variable, but also by the number of 
multinational firms. 
Consider a general equilibrium model with only one sector producing 
differentiated goods. Both the home and foreign country’s national firms are assumed to 
have the same fixed and marginal production cost, denoted by f and γ,  respectively. 
Furthermore, multinational firms have the same fixed cost as national firms but a 
different marginal production cost )( im hiγ , which is determined by the level of 
headquarter services and 0)(' <im hiγ . To abstract from the transportation cost and tariffs 
associated with international trade, the differentiated goods are assumed to be non-
tradable.  
Now, the cost to produce x units of a differentiated good in terms of labor units 
ini
l , and 
imi
l
,
by a national and a multinational firm in country i, respectively, can be 
written as  
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In equations (2) and (3), 
ini
x , is the output of a national firm in country i, while 
imi
x
,
and 
imj
x
,
(i≠j) represent the outputs of a multinational firm in the home (i) and foreign 
country (j), respectively.  
Suppose that factor price is equalized and the relative wage rate is normalized to 
one. Then, the profit functions for a national and a multinational firm in country i are as 
follows: 
 )( ,,,, iiii nininini xfxP γπ +−⋅=        (4) 
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In equations (4) and (5), 
ini
P
,
, 
imi
P
,
and 
imj
P
,
are the prices of goods sold by a 
national and a multinational firm from country i in the home and foreign country, 
respectively.  
Now, let dik represent a typical consumer k’s consumption of goods in country i. 
With ni number of national firms and (mi + mj) number of multinational firms, the 
representative utility function of consumers is 
 
 ∑
++
=
=
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ik
ikik dU
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Through utility maximization, it is easy to show that the inverse demand functions 
in both the home and foreign country is: 11 −−= ββλ ikiik dP , where λi is the shadow price 
on the budget constraint. By plugging in the equilibrium price into equations (4) and (5), 
we can solve for the profit-maximizing prices, given the level of headquarter services in 
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the second stage. It can be shown that both the home and foreign country’s national firms 
charge the same price, i.e. γβ 1,
−=
ini
P  while multinational firms have the same price in 
both the home and foreign country, i.e.  )(1,, immjmi hPP iii γβ
−== .  
 Using zero profit and utility maximization conditions, we have the following 
equilibrium conditions regarding the outputs of national and multinational firms. 
)1(/ 1, −=
−βγfx
ini
        (7) 
)]1(/[]/)([ 1)1/(1,, −==
−− βγγγ β fhxx immjmi iii     (8) 
)]1)((/[)2( 1,, −++=+
−βγ imiimjmi hCChfxx iii     (9) 
 
Then, multinational firms can figure out the profit-maximizing headquarter 
services, hi*.  For simplicity, let iim hhi δγγ −=)( , δ>0.  Using backward induction, the 
optimal level of headquarter services is 
1* / ( / )[(1 / ) /(2 )]i i j ih L L m ft
βγ δ γ δ α γ δ −= − +     (10) 
where )1/( ββ −=t  
 
Using equations (8)-(10), the equilibrium number of multinational firms is2
[( / ) / ]
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     (11) 
where 11 )1(2 −−− −= βββ tfk  
 
                                                 
2 We have used Taylor expansion to simplify the non-linear equation to derive the result in equation (11). 
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The implications we can derive from equation (11) are straightforward. First, the 
distance between two countries, D, is negatively related to the equilibrium number of 
multinational firms, mi*, which is an indicator of FDI activities. The reason that the 
greater the distances the less MNCs is due to the existence of the communication cost for 
transferring headquarter services, which increases with the physical distance between two 
countries. Second, the technology parameter ci(Ti,Tj) is negatively related to FDI 
activities. In other words, the development of IT in either the home or foreign country 
will shrink the perceived physical distance between two nations and encourage FDI. 
Overall, the distance-related communication cost is inversely related to the number of 
multinational firms. Third, the number of MNCs or bilateral FDI activities is positively 
related to the product of two countries' population (or economic size), which is consistent 
with the prediction of  the gravity equation. 
 In sum, the  theoretical framework developed in this section provides a 
foundation for a gravity-type FDI model. That is, bilateral FDI activities are positively 
related to the economic sizes of the home and host countries, while it is negatively related 
to physical distance between the two countries, discounted by the development of IT.  
 
3. Empirical Test  
 In this section, we use an IT-augmented gravity equation, justified by  equation 
(11), to empirically test the impact of IT and distance on FDI. Although the gravity 
model is the most popular empirical framework for bilateral international trade, it has not 
been used much for FDI due to the lack of bilateral FDI data. Nonetheless, using FDI and 
MNC data for the U.S. and Asian countries, Brainard (1997), Blonigen and Davies 
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(2000), and Stone and Jeon (2000) all find the gravity model to be very successful in 
explaining multinational activities. More specifically, we have 
)12(
tanlog*log
logtanloglogloglog
,1110,98
,7,6,5
,43,2,1,
tijijitjiji
tjtjjitji
tjijitjtittji
NAFTAEUTreatyLanguage
openFDIopenTradeceDisIT
ITceDisGDPGDPFDI
εββββ
βββ
ββββα
+++++
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++++=
−−−−
−−
−−−
 
 
 In equation (12), tjiFDI ,log −  is the log of FDI stocks in millions of US dollars 
from country i to country j at time t.  tiGDP ,log  and tjGDP ,log  are the logs of GDP in 
the home and host countries, respectively. Since FDI is positively related to the home and 
host countries’ economic sizes, the coefficients of both GDP variables are expected to be 
positive. jiceDis −tanlog  is the log of distance in kilometers between the capital cities of 
country i and country j. As our theory suggests, the farther away the two countries are, 
the higher the communication cost and then the lower the FDI. Therefore, 3β should be 
negative.  
tjiIT ,log −  is an indicator of the sophistication of the IT network between the home and 
host countries at time t. The IT variables are measured by the teledensity index, the number of 
telephone lines per 100 persons, and the celldensity index, the number of wireless phones per 
100 persons in each country. The product of the teledensity (celldensity) for the host and home 
countries ( tjti ITIT ,, log*log ) is used to measure the development of IT over time because 
effective communications require an advancement of IT from both ends. In addition, we also 
combine teledensity and celldensity as another proxy of IT development since wireless 
technology has provided a fast and inexpensive way for many countries to catch up in building 
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communication infrastructure. To be consistent with our theory, we expect 4β  to be positive. 
That is, the higher the IT adoption rate for both countries, the more FDI from the home country 
to the host country. We also include an interactive term of the IT variable and the distance in 
the regression to test the hypothesis that the development of IT encourages FDI by reducing the 
communication cost. Without the interactive term, the impact of distance on bilateral FDI 
inward stocks is measured by 3tanlog/log β=∂∂ ceDisFDI . When incorporating the 
interactive term, the impact is measured by ')(logtanlog/log 353 βββ =+=∂∂ − jiITceDisFDI . 
We expect 5β  to be positive or small negative. In other words, we hypothesize that the 
negative role of physical distance will be reduced by the development of ITso that 3 3 'β β . 
Finally, some traditional control variables are added into the IT-augmented 
gravity equation. tjopenTrade ,  is the host country’s imports as a percentage of the GDP. 
This variable controls for the host country’s openness to trade. A high import to GDP 
ratio implies that the host country has less restrictions on imports. According to the 
“tariff-jumping” FDI theory, less FDI activities should follow. However, if FDI and trade 
are complements, as found by Lipsey and Weiss (1981 and 1984), the coefficient 6β  
should be positive. tjopenFDI ,  measures a country’s openness to FDI, which is 
calculated as the ratio of the host country’s inward FDI flows to its GDP. Everything else 
being the same, a better investment environment will encourage FDI from country i to 
country j. In addition, four dummy variables jiLanguage − , tjiTreaty ,− , jiEU −  and 
jiNAFTA −  are included. jiLanguage −  indicates whether or not the two countries speak 
the same language. Countries speaking the same language can communicate more easily 
with each other and are supposed to have more FDI activities. tjiTreaty ,−  shows whether 
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or not country i and j have an agreement on taxation of income and capital at year t. It is 
believed that a bilateral tax agreement provides a favorable environment for FDI 
activities. jiEU −  and jiNAFTA −  suggests whether or not country i and j are members of 
the European Union and NAFTA (after 1994), respectively. They capture the effect of the 
regional economic integration on FDI movement.  
 Given the availability of the data, our sample includes 27 OECD countries and 20 
non-OECD countries from 1980 to 1997. Since G7 countries are the major source of FDI 
activity, we focus our study on the FDI from G7 countries to all other countries. The data 
sources and the definitions of the variables used in this study are described in the 
Appendix. The descriptive statistics of all variables are reported in Table 1.  
 Table 2 presents the estimation results for inward FDI stocks using OLS 
regression.3
2R
 All regressions take the time fixed effect into account and we use the robust 
estimators of variance that allow for correlation in repeated observations for the same 
pairs of countries. In column (1) – (4), we run regressions with the host-country fixed 
effect. We first use teledensity as a proxy of IT development in column (1). Then we 
combine teledensity and celldensity as an alternative proxy for the IT variable in column 
(3). The interactive term of the IT variable and distance are included in columns (2) and 
(4). In columns (5) – (8), the regressions control for the country-pair fixed effect, 
producing higher . The coefficients of the year and country dummies are not shown in 
the table due to space constraints. 
                                                 
3 We use FDI stocks rather than FDI flows because there were many negative and zero numbers in the FDI 
flow data.  The estimation results using FDI flows with a smaller number of observations were not much 
different from the results using the FDI stocks. 
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As we can see, the coefficient on distance is always negative and significant. The 
distance elasticity of inward FDI stock is in the range of -0.79 to -0.84.4
)(log53 jiIT −+ ββ
  This is 
consistent with our communication cost assumption for managing multinationals. The 
communication costs for sharing headquarter services increase with the distance between 
two countries. Hence, less FDI activities are expected.  As expected, the coefficient of the 
interactive term is either positive or small negative.  We should note that after including 
the interactive term of IT variable and distance in columns (2) and (4), the overall 
elasticity of distance on FDI is . Given that the mean of tjiIT ,log −  is 
10.24, the overall distance elasticity is -0.8019 and -0.8255 respectively. Based on the 
results in Table 2, it is not obvious whether the development of IT has reduced the 
negative role of distance on FDI. 
Nonetheless, we do find that the growth of IT for a country pair encourages FDI. 
The coefficient on the IT variable is always positive and statistically significant.  More 
specifically, the coefficient on the IT variable is 0.217 in column (7) without the 
interactive term, while it ranges from 0.177 to 0.435 with the interactive term according 
to column (8).5
 To test the robustness of our results, we utilize sub-sample analysis using the 
country-pair fixed effect model, which produces a higher 
  It implies that any one percent increase in the IT network will increase a 
country’s inward FDI stocks by 0.18 to 0.44 percent. 
2R  than the host-country only 
fixed effect. We first split the data into two groups: for FDI from G7 to OECD countries 
and from G7 to non-OECD countries. The results are reported in Table 3. We find that 
                                                 
4 Distance is dropped in the country-pair fixed effect model, since it does not vary over time. For similar 
reasons, Language and EU dummies are dropped as well.  
5 The overall elasticity of IT on FDI is (0.8613-0.0795*logDistance). The range is calculated using 
minimum and maximum of logDistance, which is 5.27 and 9.85 respectively.  
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the growth of teledensity and celldensity encourages more FDI from G7 to OECD 
countries than from G7 to non-OECD countries. For example, one percent increase in the 
global telephone network will increase FDI inward stocks by 0.83 for OECD countries 
while only by 0.17 for non-OECD countries. Similar results are found when aggregating 
teledensity and celldensity as a proxy of IT development. The finding suggests that FDI 
between developed countries requires more communications than that between developed 
and developing countries. Hence, the development of IT tends to have larger impact on 
FDI between G7 and other OECD countries.  
 Next, we divide the data into two time periods: the 1980s and the 1990s.  As we 
can see in Table 4, the coefficient of the IT variable is not significant in the 1980s while 
it turns out to be very significant in the 1990s, implying a more prominently favorable 
role of the development of IT in enhancing the FDI activities in the 1990s than in the 
1980s.  Also, the interactive term of IT and distance become statistically significantin the 
1990s.6
 An interesting finding is reported in Table 5 after we split the whole sample into 
two groups by distance. In columns (1) – (4), the distance between the capital cities of the 
two countries is less than the average distance of our whole sample, which is 4,722 km, 
while in columns (5) – (8), the distance is greater than the average distance in the sample. 
All regressions employ the aggregation of teledensity and celldensity as a proxy of the IT 
variable.  When the distance is shorter than the average distance, the elasticity of distance 
is always negative and significant. After we introduce the interactive term of IT and 
distance into the regression, the IT variable becomes insignificant and the overall 
  
                                                 
6 Since all regressions in Tables 3 and 4 include country-pair and time dummies, distance is dropped as it 
does not vary over time. Consequently, we are unable to evaluate the change of the elasticity of distance 
with respect to FDI when the interactive term of IT and distance is included. 
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elasticity of distance becomes more negative (-1.346<-1.275)7. On the other hand, when 
distance is larger than the average distance, the elasticity of distance is not significant 
with the interactive term and the overall elasticity of distance becomes less negative (-
1.140>-1.154)8
Overall, the IT-augmented gravity model performs quite well in explaining the 
bilateral FDI activities. All regressions have a R-square above 70 percent. Specifically, 
the values of R-square are above 90 percent in the regressions with the country-pair fixed 
effect, which are much higher than the R-squares from the regressions with the host-
country fixed effect.  
. In addition, the IT variable turns to be much more significant.  These 
findings suggest that IT becomes more effective in reducing the communication cost and 
encouraging FDI when the distance between the home and host countries is larger than 
the average distance, although its marginal impact seems to decrease.  
Moreover, almost all of the traditional variables in a gravity equation return 
expected signs. Both the home and host country’s GDP are positive, which indicates the 
importance of market size for FDI activity. In addition, tjopenFDI ,  is positively related 
to FDI as expected because the high openness to FDI attracts more international 
investors. The coefficient of tjopenTrade ,  is negative and significant in most cases, 
which supports the “tariff-jumping” theory. Language and a bilateral treaty are important 
determinants for bilateral FDI after controlling for the host-country fixed effect. The 
evidence for the impact of regional economic integration on FDI are mixed. Although 
NAFTA seems to encourage FDI from the US and Canada to Mexico according to the 
                                                 
7 The overall elasticity of distance is equal to (-1.6034+0.0216*logIT), where logIT is the mean of logIT in 
the sub-sample.  
8 Similarly, the overall elasticity of distance is equal to (-0.3503-0.0795*logIT), where logIT is the mean of 
logIT in the sub-sample.  
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sub-sample analysis in Table 3, we do not find integration in Europe to encourage 
bilateral FDI between member countries. Frankel (1997) gives similar results for bilateral 
trade between EU member countries. Part of the reason is due to the fact that the progress 
of regional economic integration in Europe has been rather gradual since the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, compared with the economic integration in North America, which 
culminated in mid 1990s. Therefore, our dummy variable for NAFTA captured 
significant growth of FDI after 1994 while no obvious growth occurred in FDI between 
EU member countries during the period between 1980 and 1997.   
  
4. Conclusion 
  This paper offers a theory based empirical analysis on the impact of IT on FDI 
activities by MNCs. We provide a theoretical justification for using the an IT-augmented 
FDI gravity model. We find that distance is an important impediment to bilateral FDI due 
to the high communication cost of sharing information, knowledge and other intangible 
assets within MNCs.  In addition, we provided empirical evidence that the joint 
development of IT in the home and host countries encourages FDI significantly.    In 
particular, IT has a more remarkably favorable impact on FDI activities from G7 to 
OECD countries, compared to non-OECD countries, and the impact is more significant 
during the 1990s than the 1980s. Moreover, an investigation of the interaction term 
between IT and distance and the total elasticity of FDI with respect to distance confirms 
that IT encourages FDI by decreasing the perceived distance between countrieswhen 
distance is beyond a threshold range.  
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Thefindings in this paper have important policy implications for the FDI policy in 
a host country. It is suggested that the development of a modern communication 
infrastructure should be high on the priority list for countries in order to attract FDI. In 
addition, the role of multinational headquarters as an information-processing center is 
strengthened with modern communication technology. In other words, multinational 
firms are better able to disperse operations globally while coordinating and leveraging 
production and financial management more efficiently over long distances due to the 
recent development of information technology.     
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
jiFDI −log  log of FDI stocks from country i to country j 
6.1243 2.4415 -1.9800 13.0237 
jGDPlog  log of GDP in the host country 4.7417 1.3656 0.9821 9.0240 
iGDPlog  log of GDP in the home country 7.0799 0.8658 5.5722 9.0240 
jiceDis −tanlog
 
log of distance between the capital 
cities of country i and country j 
8.4583 1.0184 5.2743 9.8526 
jiIT −log  
Log of teledensity in the home 
country times log of teledensity in 
the host country 
10.2429 5.3256 -5.8107 19.7632 
Log of (teledencity+celldensity) in 
the home country times log of 
(teledencity+celldensity) in the host 
country  
10.6382 5.6472 -5.8107 21.9667 
jopenTrade  openness to trade in host country 35.4884 30.2679 4.6313 223.6470 
jopenFDI  openness to FDI in host country 1.4656 2.0272 -0.8424 15.2025 
ceDis
IT ji
tanlog
log ∗−
 
the interaction term of 
logIT(teledensity) and logDistance 
85.1339 45.1088 -54.1536 172.6459 
The interaction term of 
logIT(teledensity+celldensity) and 
logDistance   
88.2520 47.8820 -54.1536 199.6993 
 
Note: FDI, GDP are in billions of US dollars. Distance is in kilometers. Teledensity is the number 
of telephone lines per 100 residents and celldensity is the number of cell phones per 100 
residents. OpenTrade and openFDI are all in percentages.  
 
 .  
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Table 2. Information Technology and Inward FDI Stocks  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 With host dummy  With country pair dummy  
 IT=tele IT=tele IT=tele+cell IT=tele+cell IT=tele IT=tele IT=tele+cell IT=tele+cell 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
logGDPj,t 0.1977 0.1973 0.2651 0.2657 0.4367*** 0.4177*** 0.5057*** 0.4965*** 
 (1.10) (1.09) (1.48) (1.48) (2.86) (2.80) (3.31) (3.32) 
logGDPi,t 1.2253*** 1.2257*** 1.1848*** 1.1849*** 0.6455*** 0.5896** 0.6248*** 0.6038** 
 (17.60) (17.60) (16.86) (16.87) (2.75) (2.54) (2.59) (2.52) 
logDistancei-j -0.7946*** -0.8388*** -0.8273*** -0.8041***     
 (-8.23) (-3.60) (-8.54) (-3.58)     
logITi,t*logITj,t 0.3127*** 0.2815* 0.3521*** 0.3682** 0.2105*** 0.8873*** 0.2165*** 0.7324*** 
 (5.24) (1.75) (5.44) (2.31) (4.45) (3.80) (4.33) (3.79) 
logIT*logDistance  0.0036  -0.0018  -0.0760***  -0.0564*** 
  (0.22)  (-0.12)  (-3.13)  (-2.99) 
openTradej,t -0.0179*** -0.0181*** -0.0213*** -0.0212*** -0.0135*** -0.0113** -0.0150*** -0.0129** 
 (-3.22) (-3.25) (-3.58) (-3.61) (-2.70) (-2.48) (-2.86) (-2.72) 
openFDIj,t 0.0871*** 0.0874*** 0.0818** 0.0815** 0.0938*** 0.0909*** 0.0943*** 0.0883*** 
 (2.67) (2.67) (2.47) (2.47) (2.95) (3.03) (2.92) (2.87) 
language 0.6494*** 0.6512*** 0.6461*** 0.6453***     
 (2.74) (2.74) (2.72) (2.71)     
treaty 0.5079*** 0.5101*** 0.5152*** 0.5139*** -0.0184 0.0440 -0.0332 0.0141 
 (3.28) (3.31) (3.33) (3.33) (-0.05) (0.12) (-0.09) (0.04) 
EU -0.1334 -0.1207 -0.1496 -0.1557     
 (-0.47) (-0.42) (-0.52) (-0.54)     
NAFTA -0.1611 -0.1528 -0.1581 -0.1642 -0.0077 -0.1697 0.0547 -0.1082 
 (-0.42) (-0.40) (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.04) (-0.80) (0.28) (-0.44) 
No. of observation 4232 4232 4014 4014 4232 4232 4014 4014 
R-square 0.729 0.729 0.731 0.731 0.904 0.906 0.905 0.907 
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 Table 3. IT and Inward FDI Stocks, G7 to OECD vs. non-OECD countries (with the country-pair fixed effect) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 OECD countries Non-OECD countries 
 IT=tele IT=tele IT=tele+cell IT=tele+cell IT=tele IT=tele IT=tele+cell IT=tele+cell 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
logGDPj,t 0.3458 0.3460 0.8346** 0.7805** 0.3127* 0.3169* 0.3289* 0.3365* 
 (1.05) (1.04) (2.48) (2.35) (1.78) (1.80) (1.74) (1.79) 
logGDPi,t 0.7589*** 0.7611*** 0.8655*** 0.8810*** 0.6551* 0.5907* 0.6379* 0.5556 
 (2.88) (2.87) (3.24) (3.28) (2.88) (1.70) (1.67) (1.49) 
logITi,t*logITj,t 0.8346*** 0.8966*** 0.7402*** 1.0629*** 0.1735*** 0.3667 0.1449*** 0.3867 
 (6.24) (4.06) (5.20) (4.64) (3.36) (1.08) (2.68) (1.31) 
logIT*logDistance  -0.0086  -0.0392**  -0.0220  -0.0276 
  (-0.33)  (-2.03)  (-0.57)  (-0.83) 
openTradej,t -0.0255** -0.0253** -0.0228** -0.0210* -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0073* -0.0069 
 (-2.44) (-2.41) (-2.00) (-1.94) (-1.23) (-1.16) (-1.69) (-1.60) 
openFDIj,t 0.0985** 0.0987** 0.0905* 0.0858* 0.0532** 0.0543** 0.0610** 0.0624*** 
 (2.25) (2.26) (1.84) (1.77) (2.51) (2.56) (2.62) (2.68) 
treaty 0.3062 0.3296 0.4246 0.5357 -0.0610 -0.0727 -0.1135 -0.1375 
 (0.47) (0.49) (0.58) (0.73) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.34) (-0.40) 
NAFTA -0.0904 -0.1125 0.0276 0.1418 0.4260** 0.3696 0.3916* 0.3082 
 (-0.49) (-0.58) (0.19) (0.84) (2.15) (1.62) (1.93) (1.36) 
No. of observation 2500 2500 2397 2397 1732 1732 1617 1617 
R-square 0.918 0.918 0.915 0.916 0.893 0.894 0.895 0.896 
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Table 4. IT and Inward FDI Stocks, the 1980s vs. the 1990s (with the country-pair fixed effect) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 1980-1989 1990-1997 
 IT=tele IT=tele IT=tele+cell IT=tele+cell IT=tele IT=tele IT=tele+cell IT=tele+cell 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
logGDPj,t 0.3987*** 0.3971*** 0.3974** 0.4122** 0.4183*** 0.5286*** 0.4727*** 0.5918*** 
 (2.87) (2.87) (2.55) (2.66) (2.92) (3.75) (3.28) (4.05) 
logGDPi,t 0.6848*** 0.6867*** 0.6891*** 0.6712*** 0.0198 0.0486 0.0672 0.1269 
 (3.42) (3.34) (3.27) (3.11) (0.06) (0.15) (0.21) (0.41) 
logITi,t*logITj,t 0.1221 0.1365 0.1246 0.0038 0.1396*** 1.3419*** 0.1194*** 0.8613*** 
 (1.38) (0.67) (1.25) (0.02) (3.65) (3.71) (2.73) (3.59) 
logIT*logDistance  -0.0017  0.0144  -0.1340***  -0.0795*** 
  (-0.07)  (0.61)  (-3.46)  (-3.27) 
openTradej,t -0.0022 -0.0022 0.0012 0.0015 -0.0062 -0.0047 -0.0058 -0.0053 
 (-0.40) (-0.41) (0.26) (0.33) (-1.36) (-1.09) (-1.20) (-1.15) 
openFDIj,t 0.0488* 0.0490* 0.0979*** 0.0966*** 0.0207 0.0123 0.0244 0.0150 
 (1.83) (1.85) (2.67) (2.70) (0.74) (0.46) (0.85) (0.53) 
treaty -0.3309* -0.3301* -0.4825*** -0.4896*** 0.9805 1.0367 1.0041 1.0674 
 (-1.94) (-1.91) (-3.65) (-3.69) (1.45) (1.55) (1.51) (1.63) 
NAFTA     -0.0943 -0.1500 -0.0677 -0.1421 
     (-0.45) (-0.66) (-0.31) (-0.55) 
# of observation 2010 2010 1792 1792 2222 2222 2222 2222 
R-square 0.958 0.958 0.959 0.959 0.931 0.933 0.930 0.932 
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Table 5. IT and Inward FDI Stocks by Distance (IT=teledensity+celldensity) 
 
Note: *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  a  Distance < 4,722 km,  b Distance > 4,722 km.  The average distance 
between the home and host countries among the 47 countries under investigation is computed using lnDistance = 8.46
 Short-Distance Pair Countriesa Long-Distance Pair Countriesb 
 With host dummy With country pair dummy  With host dummy With country pair dummy  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
logGDPj,t 0.5901** 0.5961** 0.6186** 0.6098** 0.2416 0.2640 0.5148*** 0.5209*** 
 (2.16) (2.19) (2.22) (2.20) (1.17) (1.32) (2.70) (2.82) 
logGDPi,t 1.0761*** 1.0690*** 0.1782 0.1871 1.1930*** 1.2050*** 0.7263*** 0.7598*** 
 (8.79) (8.53) (0.35) (0.37) (15.80) (16.19) (2.59) (2.75) 
logDistancei-j -1.2750*** -1.6034**   -1.1537*** -0.3503   
 (-3.91) (-1.96)   (-4.92) (-0.55)   
logITi,t*logITj,t 0.3182*** 0.1436 0.3131*** 0.5917* 0.3722*** 1.0933** 0.2134*** 1.1051* 
 (2.72) (0.32) (2.89) (1.77) (5.15) (2.36) (3.73) (1.66) 
logIT*logDisance  0.0216  -0.0339  -0.0795  -0.0966 
  (0.38)  (-0.89)  (-1.63)  (-1.38) 
openTradej,t -0.0221* -0.0233* -0.0165 -0.0149 -0.0179*** -0.0173*** -0.0122** -0.0118** 
 (-1.73) (-1.79) (-1.29) (-1.18) (-3.05) (-2.94) (-2.53) (-2.43) 
openFDIj,t 0.1814** 0.1865** 0.1580** 0.1509** 0.0400 0.0422 0.0603** 0.0601** 
 (2.42) (2.52) (2.05) (2.03) (1.40) (1.50) (2.26) (2.28) 
language -0.1538 -0.1726   0.9139*** 0.9252***   
 (-0.36) (-0.41)   (3.08) (3.13)   
treaty 0.4404** 0.4489** -1.2115* -1.1696* 0.6214*** 0.5615** 0.3881 0.3679 
 (2.08) (2.19) (-1.72) (-1.65) (2.70) (2.45) (0.93) (0.94) 
NAFTA -0.1008 -0.1214 -0.0355 -0.0068     
 (-0.45) (-0.55) (-0.13) (-0.02)     
# of observations 1522 1522 1522 1522 2492 2492 2492 2492 
R-square 0.804 0.804 0.897 0.897 0.739 0.742 0.916 0.917 
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Appendix  
 
 The bilateral FDI statistics used in this study are from the International Direct 
Investment Statistics Yearbook published annually by the OECD since 1993. Since the 
data is relatively new, we will discuss it in detail here. The data covers inward and 
outward FDI flows and stock to (from) OECD countries from (to) the rest of the world. 
The time period for this database is between 1980 and 1997. The statistics are based 
mainly on the balance-of-payment data compiled by the central banks or the statistical 
offices of OECD countries. There are limitations in data comparability due to differences 
in national definitions. According to the IMF’s definition, FDI refers to investments by a 
resident in another country that lead to 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or 
voting power. FDI should have three components: equity capital, reinvested earnings, and 
inter-company debt. In fact, not all countries have used the 10 percent ownership 
threshold to define FDI until recent years. The comparability of the FDI data is 
particularly hampered by the fact that reinvested earnings and inter-company loans were 
not included in the data for Belgium-Luxemburg and Denmark until 1992, or Greece, 
Hungary, Japan, Korea, and Portugal until 1996.  
 In addition, FDI flows are used to estimate missing FDI stocks. Since the FDI 
statistics between two OECD member countries are reported as FDI inflows by the host 
country and as outflows by the source country, the inflow and outflow data between the 
same country pair should be the same in theory. However, due to national differences in 
FDI definition, currency and statistical errors, they are different most of the time. 
Nonetheless, the FDI data reported by the host and source countries are highly correlated, 
with the correlation coefficient above 90 percent. Therefore, we mainly use the FDI data 
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compiled by a host country while using the information reported by a source country to 
make up missing values.  
 The GDP, GDP per capita, teledensity, and celldensity data are from the World 
Telecommunications Indicators published by the International Telecommunications 
Union. The ratios of a country’s imports and inward FDI relative to GDP are from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The bilateral income and capital tax 
agreement information is collected from the website of Oceana Publications 
(www.oceanalaw.com).  
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